Ukraine’s incursion disrupts Putin’s war of attempted conquest

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The writer is author of ‘Command: The Politics of Military Operations from Korea to Ukraine’ and the Substack ‘Comment is Freed’

The first half of 2023 was dominated by speculation about when and how Ukraine would launch its big offensive to liberate Russian-held territory. Fresh battalions were being trained and equipped for the push. The most likely objective — driving through Russian defences towards the Black Sea — was widely discussed. The only uncertainty was timing. When the offensive kicked off in June 2023, there was therefore precious little surprise. Russian defences were well prepared. The Ukrainian army lacked the kit, training, air support and command structures to achieve a major breakthrough.

From late last year, Russia went on its own offensive, helped by Kyiv’s delays in mobilising more troops and congressional blocks on more support to Ukraine. The Russians battered Ukraine’s defensive lines with deadly glide bombs and assaults from apparently inexhaustible supplies of expendable infantry. Russia suffered enormous losses in men and equipment, but with its economy now geared to war and new recruits to fill the gaps, it pressed on, slowly pushing back the outgunned, outmanned Ukrainians and taking ruined towns and villages.

In addition, Russia targeted Ukraine’s infrastructure and residential areas. Ukraine had some success pushing the Russian navy out of the Black Sea, hitting oil refineries and imposing high costs on the Russian army for small gains. Nonetheless the cumulative impact was tiring and demoralising. The best strategic advice on offer was to exhaust and deplete the Russian attackers, holding on until more trained troops and improved supplies of ammunition and equipment were available. Another attempted offensive appeared too risky. Against this backdrop, there was talk of ceasefires and negotiations. With his forces enjoying the initiative, Vladimir Putin showed little interest in any deal other than on his maximum terms. 

Catching everybody by surprise, Ukrainian forces began a new offensive on August 6. This was done in a wholly unexpected way, advancing across the border into the Kursk oblast. The initial response, even from some Ukrainian analysts, was this was more madness than genius, sacrificing precious troops for a showy but pointless operation instead of bolstering the hard-pressed defences in Donetsk. It appeared as a vanity project, designed by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and his commander-in-chief Oleksandr Syrskyi to impress partners and boost morale but offering no lasting gain.

It did not take too long before the mood changed. This was no mere daring raid by a few hundred troops but a combined operation involving a number of brigades. It made rapid progress, taking territory and prisoners. Lessons had been learnt from 2023. Operational security was and remains tight. Enemy communications were jammed; experienced troops were used rather than new recruits; Ukrainian aircraft put in appearances; Russian strong points were bypassed. Well over a week into the operation, the Ukrainians claim to have taken up to 1,000km of Russian territory (far more than Russia managed over the past eight months), with more than 80 villages under their control, including the town of Sudzha. Drone attacks on Russian airfields and air defences back up the operation.

Putin could not deny the seriousness of the situation, given that some 200,000 people have been evacuated from border regions. Struggling to admit that Russia has been invaded, he terms Ukraine’s actions terrorism and a provocation. He has put in charge Alexei Dyumin, his former bodyguard and trusted loyalist, with the FSB, responsible for internal security, taking the lead over the military.

A natural assumption is that, once it gets over the shock, Russia should have little trouble pushing the Ukrainians out. But Russia has committed its army to conquering its neighbour. It lacks ample, capable reserves to divert to expelling the invaders. Units are being cobbled together. Command and control seem poor. Logistics are being disrupted. Elementary mistakes have led to one convoy of troops getting badly mauled. There are reports of Ukrainian units ambushed or stuck in intense fights, but they still enjoy the initiative and are taking more territory.

Overstretched forces and attenuated supply lines are a risk for Ukraine. Some units may get cut off and be unable to retreat. Kyiv will need to decide how much territory it wants to hold, and how many more troops it dare commit to this operation, but for now it is making the most of Russian uncertainty.  

Zelenskyy has said that this operation will bring peace closer. These events undoubtedly embarrass Putin, but he may just double down, as in September 2022 after Ukraine’s last successful offensive. Then he ordered ferocious attacks on Ukraine’s cities and yet more mobilisation. But his economy is overheating and suffering from labour shortages. He now has to qualify his claim that any peace settlement must take account of new territorial realities.

It may be that Ukraine’s offensive is largely about grabbing territory for later negotiations, and taking prisoners to be exchanged for their POWs. If Kyiv can keep this going, then the strategic impact could be substantial, shifting the fighting as much as possible into Russian territory, relieving pressure on Ukraine’s defensive lines, as Russia is forced to scale back its own offensive operations.